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Introduction 
 
 
#We Are Not Charlie 
Muslims’ Differentiated Reactions to the Paris Attacks, and the Dangers of 
Indiscriminate Finger-pointing 
Jannis Grimm 
After the January 2015 attacks in Paris, Muslims from all over the world showed im-
pressive solidarity with the victims. This was the more surprising given that the victims 
included cartoonists working for the satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo”, whose cari-
catures of Mohammed had previously caused mass protests in predominantly Muslim 
states. However, European media took more notice of the protests against the new edi-
tion of the satirical magazine than of the declarations of solidarity. This selective per-
ception can partly be explained by the fact that European societies constantly expect 
Muslims to distance themselves from violent acts committed in the name of Islam. These 
demands reinforce negative associations of Islam with terrorism and violence, and nour-
ish threat perceptions and anti-Islamic prejudices, which in turn contribute to Muslims 
feeling increasingly excluded in Europe. Extremists can take advantage of this alienation 
for recruiting purposes. To counter this danger, politicians and the media must act 
decisively against negative portrayals of Islam and reduce the pressure put on Muslims 
to justify themselves, a pressure that deepens the division of European societies. 
 
Rarely has an Islamist terror attack been 
met with such an unequivocal and quick 
response from Muslims both within Europe 
and outside of it. The attacks in Paris were 
condemned in the strongest possible terms 
by critics ranging from the Arab League and 
Arabic journalist associations to the most 
influential religious authorities and Islamic 
organizations. Those voicing criticism of 
the attacks included Egypt’s Al-Azhar Uni-
versity, the International Union of Muslim 
Scholars under the chairmanship of Sheyk 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah, and the 
supreme councils of Muslim scholars of the 
Arabian Peninsula, South East Asia, Pakistan, 
and the Balkans. The heads of state or for-
eign ministers of a great number of pre-
dominantly Muslim countries (Egypt, Alge-
ria, Jordan, Qatar, Mali, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates) took 
part in the unity march of 11 January in 
Paris. Other states condemned the act of 
terror in official statements or messages of 
condolence, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Pakistan. 
When key Western media interpreted 
the attack on Charlie Hebdo as an assault on 
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press freedom, and thus on one of the 
cornerstones of democracy, the media of 
the above countries largely agreed. The 
two most influential pan-Arabic daily news-
papers, Asharq al-Awsat and Al Hayat (both 
financed by Saudi Arabia), classified the 
attacks as massacres and any attempts at 
justifying them, as terrorism. Al-Hayat 
referred to an attack on the very heart of 
Paris. Many newspapers published cari-
catures which declared the moral victory 
of satire over jihadist terrorism or chal-
lenged the attackers’ religious legitimacy. 
Some national newspapers, including the 
Egyptian Al-Masry al-Youm and Masr al-Arabiya, 
discussed the attacks in the context of the 
international campaign against the Islamic 
State (IS) jihadists. In this context, the 
Iranian Doulat-e Bahar even printed a Charlie 
Hebdo caricature of the IS leader Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi. 
The solidarity campaign “Je suis Char-
lie”, which had been started by French 
journalists’ associations after the attacks, 
struck a chord in Muslim countries as well. 
This was especially true of states with close 
connections to France, such as Lebanon, 
Algeria, Morocco as well as in Turkey. The 
Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal promoted the 
slogan to its front page, as did Turkey’s four 
biggest satirical newspapers, Girgir, Penguen, 
LeMan and Uykusuz. In Istanbul, demonstra-
tors expressed their solidarity by parading 
“Je suis Charlie” placards in front of the 
French cultural institute. 
Critical nuances 
However, the online campaign of the same 
name (#JeSuisCharlie), which in the first 
three weeks after the attacks mobilized users 
of Facebook and Twitter in particular, 
remained largely limited to Europe and the 
Anglo-American world. Contributions from 
states with majority Muslim populations 
using these hashtags on social media made 
up less than one percent of the total tweet 
volume, which by the end of January com-
prised almost eight million comments. 
Over three-quarters of the contributions 
came from France, its neighbouring coun-
tries and the US. The number of Arab or 
Turkish-language contributions remained 
extremely low at a little over 100,000 
tweets. 
This can in part be explained by the fact 
that the Paris attacks were displaced in 
Arab media coverage by jihadist violence 
closer to home, such as a devastating car 
bomb that was detonated in the Yemeni 
capital Sanaa at almost exactly the same 
time. The same is true for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Under the slogan “I am Charlie, 
but I am Baga, too”, African bloggers and 
journalist tried to draw attention to the 
Boko Haram massacres in northern Nigeria, 
which between 3 and 7 January cost hun-
dreds of lives. Many of them also lamented 
that in general Western victims of terrorist 
attacks received noticeably more media 
attention – independently of whether the 
attacks took place in European or non-
European countries. 
A number of Palestinian newspapers, 
such as Felesteen, which is close to Hamas, 
and the national Al-Quds al-Arabi, had a 
similar attitude. Both analysed the attacks 
exclusively within the context of the many 
acts of revenge against Muslim institutions 
in France. The messages of condolences 
were also put into perspective by the head-
lines of a few big Arabic and Iranian news-
papers, which made the editors of Charlie 
Hebdo and Western policies vis-à-vis the 
Muslim world partially responsible for the 
attacks. The front page of the Egyptian 
Al-Shorouk claimed that the satirical maga-
zine’s series of insults to the Prophet had 
“ended in fire”. Oman’s Al-Watan argued in 
the same vein, “They sow the wind and 
reap the whirlwind”. 
Surprisingly, firm critics of the attacks 
included a number of groups and parties 
that had in the past been denounced – 
not least by Charlie Hebdo – for their alleged 
extremism or ideological proximity to 
jihadist networks, including the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, its Palestinian sister 
organization Hamas, or Lebanon’s Hez-
bollah (however, these organizations did 
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not explicitly refer to the victims in the 
Jewish supermarket, or else made their 
comments before the hostage-taking there). 
Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah em-
phasized that the acts of the Paris assassins 
were even more of an insult to Islam than 
the satirical attacks on its messenger. The 
messages of condolence also included a 
communiqué from the President of Tunisia’s 
Ennahda party. Its victory in the country’s 
first free elections in October 2011 had given 
rise to the controversial Charia Hebdo special 
issue, whose front page showed a drawing 
by the cartoonist Luz of the Prophet Moham-
med issuing the warning, “100 lashes of the 
whip if you don’t die of laughter.” An arson 
attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices and 
personal death threats followed that issue. 
Since then, the editors had been under 
police protection. At Friday prayers in Teh-
ran, the January 2015 attack was roundly 
condemned – although it was also pointed 
out that the rise of jihadism had been made 
possible among other things by European 
and American arms deliveries. 
However, as a whole, the messages of 
condolences were in sharp contrast to pre-
vious statements. For instance, in 2012 the 
Freedom and Justice Party of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood had still been demand-
ing that the French government prosecute 
the Mohammed caricaturists. Years earlier, 
Hezbollah had even indirectly called for the 
assassination of caricaturists who insulted 
the Prophet. 
The Paris attacks were approved only 
by the Nigerian group Boko Haram, whose 
leader Abubakar Shekau declared himself 
“happy” with the events; by Islamic State; 
by Al-Qaeda offshoots in the Maghreb and 
by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (which 
assumed responsibility for the attack). On 
the Internet, too, congratulatory messages 
remained in the minority. The attacks were, 
however, glorified in many print and on-
line media that are popular with Islamists 
and jihadists, including Inspire (Al-Qaeda), 
Dhabiq (IS), Al-Sumud (Taliban) or Manba al-
Jihad (Haqqani network). Nonetheless, the 
hashtag #JeSuisKouachi, referring to the 
two Charlie Hebdo attackers, had only been 
retweeted about 78,000 times by the end 
of January 2015 – as compared to the more 
than 7.5 million re-tweets of the hashtag 
#JeSuisCharlie. 
Selective perceptions 
However, the declarations of solidarity 
made by Muslims across the world quickly 
retreated into the background of European 
media reports. This echoed the aftermath 
of previous attacks, for example those of 11 
September 2001 or the assassination of the 
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. 
After these events, demands for Muslims to 
distance themselves publicly from terror-
ism did not diminish even when the largest 
Islamic institutions denounced the attackers 
or when tens of thousands of Muslims in 
Europe demonstrated against violence. After 
the Paris attacks, once more, the worldwide 
condemnations by Muslims were quickly 
overshadowed in European media coverage 
by new and partly violent protests in a 
number of Muslim majority states (Algeria, 
Yemen, Jordan, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Chech-
nya and the Palestinian territories, among 
others). 
These Protests flared up following the 
new issue of Charlie Hebdo, which appeared 
the week after the massacre with a total 
print run of eight million copies (as com-
pared to the usual 60,000) – the highest 
total circulation ever of a French magazine. 
Its provocative cover, showing a grieving 
Prophet Mohammed with a “Je suis Charlie” 
sign in his hands, caused outrage, although 
that outrage did not reach the intensity of 
the 2006 wave of protests against the cari-
catures published by the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten. Yet, once again there were 
riots against Christian or French institu-
tions that left several people dead, this time 
in Niger and the Gaza Strip. With great 
media impact, a member of parliament in 
Pakistan put a private bounty on the owner 
of Charlie Hebdo. There were violent reactions 
to the publication even in the civil war 
areas of Syria. Jihadi militias burnt down 
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the offices of the rebel newspaper Souriyat-
na, which had devoted a whole page to the 
“Je Suis Charlie” campaign. 
Beyond these extreme cases, a majority 
of Germany’s Muslim umbrella organiza-
tions as well as prominent religious insti-
tutions across the world condemned the 
publication, including, for instance, the 
Egyptian fatwa authority Dar al-Ifta and 
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Governments 
whose representatives had participated in 
the unity march in Paris only days before 
(for instance the Egyptian and Turkish gov-
ernments) now blocked the distribution of 
copies of Charlie Hebdo in their countries. 
On 21 January Iran’s Supreme Leader, Aya-
tollah Ali Khamenei, declared in an open 
letter to the Muslim youth of Europe that 
the “derogatory and offensive” images were 
part of a concerted campaign by Western 
nations against Islam, aiming to depict it 
as the new enemy. Al-Azhar University in 
Cairo, on the other hand, tried to restrain 
believers and called on them to ignore the 
new “provocation”. 
Even though the Qur’an – unlike, say, 
the Bible – does not in fact explicitly pro-
hibit blasphemy or imagery, Muslims per-
ceived the re-printing of a caricature of 
Mohammed as a further deliberate show 
of disrespect for their religious sensibilities. 
Moreover, many Muslims disapproved of 
the cartoon’s caption, “Tout est pardonné” 
(All is forgiven), because it seemed to be 
interpreting Muslims’ worldwide expres-
sions of solidarity as a collective apology for 
the crimes of individual jihadis. For them, 
this linked the whole of Islam with terror-
ism, just as the caricature published in 
Jyllands-Posten had done by showing the 
Prophet with a bomb under his turban. 
Identifying with the victims, 
not the contents 
For the past few years, Muslims in Europe, 
as in many Arab countries, have already felt 
under constant pressure to justify them-
selves. They are regularly expected to take a 
“clear stand” against terror and violence – 
an expectation that, for many, is incom-
prehensible given that people of Muslim 
faith make up the majority of the victims 
of jihadism across the world. 
The pressure on Muslims to justify 
themselves, which re-appears after every 
Islamist terrorist attack, makes it more 
difficult for them to integrate into Euro-
pean societies. Many Muslims feel uneasy 
with being called upon to take a stand as 
Muslims, rather than as citizens, because it 
implies a latent complicity on their part. It 
also exposes an exclusive understanding of 
citizenship, which, in Germany, is mirrored 
in the controversies over such expressions 
as “the occidental Christian tradition” or 
“the German Leitkultur”, and in the debates 
over whether Islam is a part of Germany or 
not. When European Muslims are expected 
to take a stance against terrorism, they 
are not being treated as equal citizens of 
Europe’s polities, but as potentially extrem-
ist foreign bodies. They can only shake off 
such insinuations through their public 
profession of loyalty, a profession which 
they often find problematic. 
Thus the campaign of solidarity with the 
heroized victims on the Charlie Hebdo edito-
rial staff was a tightrope walk for many 
Muslims, who did not want to identify with 
the magazine’s contents. The spread of 
#JeSuisCharlie hashtags on social media 
confirms this. The 25 countries with the 
most contributions include only three 
majority-Muslim countries: Lebanon, Tur-
key and Indonesia. A much more promi-
nent hashtag in the Muslim world was 
#WhoIsMuhammad, which allowed hun-
dreds of thousands to emphasize the peace-
ful nature of their faith. However, most 
tweets by European Muslims came under 
the alternative hashtag #JeSuisAhmed 
(retweeted over 290,000 times), drawing 
attention to the French Muslim Ahmed 
Merabet, one of the two policemen mur-
dered by the Charlie Hebdo attackers. 
By contrast, pleas such as the New Yorker 
magazine’s “We must all try to be Charlie, 
not just today but everyday” disconcerted 
many Muslims; so did the fact that a num-
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ber of leading international media wanting 
to show solidarity with Charlie Hebdo un-
critically reprinted caricatures mocking 
Islam. In the opinion of many Muslims, 
Charlie Hebdo, while waving the flag of press 
freedom and freedom of expression, pri-
marily nourished racist prejudice and 
violated the personal dignity of Muslims. 
In an open letter in 2013, Olivier Cyran, 
who had worked for Charlie Hebdo until 
2001, similarly accused the satirical maga-
zine of racism and an obsessive desire to 
offend Muslims. 
Many devout Muslims – represented in 
public discourse by religious committees 
such as the Council of Senior Scholars at 
Al-Azhar University, or by European scholars 
of Islam such as the Swiss intellectual Tariq 
Ramadan – assert that Western media apply 
double standards when discussing freedom 
of expression. For notwithstanding the 
solemn declarations that may have been 
made after the Paris attacks, the right to 
free expression is not unlimited, not even 
in Europe. Most European countries, in-
cluding France, have laws against hate 
speech or other legal restrictions, such as 
Germany’s law making holocaust denial 
a punishable offence. In addition, several 
European states (Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Poland) have 
laws against blasphemy, just as many 
Muslim countries do. The legal reality dif-
fers widely in terms of both the sentences 
passed down and the frequency with which 
it is applied. Nonetheless, several of the 
Charlie Hebdo caricatures could be legally 
contested in Germany as well, since insult-
ing communities of faith and conviction 
continues to be punishable under §166 StGB, 
provided that it threatens to disturb the 
public peace. Muslim associations point 
out, however, that in Europe anti-Islamic 
racism has so far been taken noticeably less 
seriously than, say, anti-Semitism. They 
frequently cite the case of the former Charlie 
Hebdo columnist Siné as proof for what they 
consider the double standards of Western 
newsrooms when dealing with the require-
ment of free speech. Siné was fired in 2008 
for making anti-Semitic statements; his 
colleagues, meanwhile, were allowed to 
continue mocking devout Muslims. 
Islamophobia in Europe 
Against the backdrop of a noticeable rise 
in xenophobic protests in Germany since 
October 2014, many Muslims – both in and 
outside of Europe – increasingly feel that 
the authorities and political sphere proceed 
very selectively when it comes to protecting 
religious or cultural minorities. With refer-
ence to the Islamophobic theories of the 
PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans 
against the Islamization of the West) and 
its imitators, the president of the Central 
Council of Muslims in Germany, Aiman 
Mazyek, has criticized the fact that anti-
Muslim racism is becoming socially accept-
able in Germany. For him, this racism has 
been relativized by policy-makers, or even 
explicitly tolerated as being a case in point 
of free speech. Such conduct creates the 
impression that freedom of expression is 
considered particularly worth protecting 
whenever it serves as a cover for manipulat-
ing public opinion against Islam. Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s trip to 
North Africa in January 2015 showed that 
outside Europe there is also a perception 
that Muslims are being increasingly stigma-
tized. His hosts in the Maghreb declared not 
only their intention of standing shoulder to 
shoulder with the German authorities in the 
fight against Islamist terror, but also voiced 
their concerns over the rise in xenophobic 
and anti-Islamic protests in Germany. 
The accusation of double standards is 
also informed by the fear felt by many Euro-
pean Muslims that, regardless of how much 
they might distance themselves from vio-
lence and extremism, they will end up 
becoming a victim of the increasing hostil-
ity to foreigners, especially to those of 
Islamic creed. Given the reports of a notice-
able rise in vandalism and arson attacks on 
mosques, Muslim community centres and 
private individuals, this fear does not seem 
unreasonable. The Observatoire National 
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Contre l’Islamophobie recorded almost 153 
targeted intimidation attempts and assaults 
on Muslims in France in the month follow-
ing the Paris attacks – more than in the 
whole of 2014. Recently, the Collectif Contre 
l’Islamophobie en France has confirmed 
this tendency, stating that Islamophobic 
assaults had risen by 70 percent since the 
attacks compared to the previous year. 
Moreover, populist movements on the 
political right have been instrumentalizing 
the Paris attacks to mobilize support. The 
leader of France’s far-right Front National 
party, Marine Le Pen, declared that the 
country was now at war with Islamic funda-
mentalism, calling for the re-introduction 
of the death penalty for terrorists. In 
Germany, the president of the AfD party, 
Alexander Gauland, saw the attacks as con-
firmation that PEGIDA was right to warn 
of an Islamist threat. 
Ultimately, however, PEGIDA is only the 
most visible indication that anti-Islamic 
prejudice and xenophobia are now far from 
marginal phenomena. This is confirmed 
both by the sociologist Wilhelm Heitmey-
er’s studies on “group-focused enmity” and 
by the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Religions-
monitor. According to these publications, 
the vast majority of Germany’s around four 
million Muslims are fundamentally tolerant, 
liberal-democratic and strongly attached to 
both state and society. However, they are 
faced with an increasingly disapproving 
majority society. A special analysis of the 
Religionsmonitor, published the day after the 
Paris attacks, shows that more than half of 
all Germans perceive Islam as a threat, and 
almost one in two feels “like a stranger in 
his own country” because of Muslims. A 
quarter of the population even wants a 
legal ban on the immigration of Muslims. 
At the same time, Germans barely make a 
distinction between Islam and Islamism. 
For the editors of the Religionsmonitor, this 
shows that the public image of Islam in 
Germany is largely shaped by the violent 
acts of a radicalized minority. 
That is so not least because the press 
increasingly discusses Islam in the context 
of security risks for the Federal Republic. 
In the past few months, the strong media 
presence of IS and the intense domestic 
debate about German returnees from the 
war in Syria presenting a threat to national 
security have encouraged the association of 
Islam with threat scenarios. Such scenarios 
are reinforced by the intelligence services’ 
regular warnings of an abstract terror threat. 
Fears of a “foreign infiltration” of German 
society are also encouraged by the eye-
catching actions of Salafist groups – such as 
violent clashes with the police or Kurdish 
counter-demonstrators, distributing copies 
of the Qu’ran in pedestrian zones or sending 
the “sharia police” to lecture passers-by – 
and the growing numbers of refugees from 
Muslim countries in crisis. 
Moreover, well-known media scientists 
such as University Professor Kai Hafez from 
Erfurt or the head of the Media Responsibil-
ity Institute Erlangen Sabine Schiffer, as 
well as the German Islam Conference (DIK), 
lament the tendentious reporting in the 
German press, which conditions people to 
associate Muslims with threat scenarios. 
Among other things, they point the finger 
at the imagery used by various leading media 
outlets, which has long been dominated by 
perceptions of danger. Thus, as long ago as 
March 2007, the magazine Der Spiegel antici-
pated the concerns about a foreign infiltra-
tion that currently boost movements such 
as PEGIDA under the title, “Mecca Germany: 
the silent Islamization”. The cover of a 
recent issue of Focus magazine provocatively 
showed an image of an assault rifle – to 
illustrate its opposition to the German 
home secretary’s comments that the Paris 
attacks had nothing to do with Islam. 
This one-sided focus on Islam as threat 
could end up creating a situation in Europe 
whereby the relationship between majority 
society and Muslim minorities is no longer 
negotiated openly, but is essentially left 
to the authorities responsible for internal 
security, meaning the police, justice system 
and intelligence services. 
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Taking alienation seriously 
While Europe’s response cannot be to cen-
sure publications that criticize Islam, it is 
nonetheless worth debating whether – even 
in a free society – journalists should not 
be asked to take more responsibility for the 
impact of their work in a social context 
that is already rife with Islamophobia. 
Satire – traditionally a means of giving the 
politically marginalized a critical voice, too 
– runs the risk of degenerating into mere 
manipulation of public opinion and agita-
tion when it takes aim at those very same 
marginal groups. 
Yet, there is more at issue here than a 
lack of tact in dealing with other faith com-
munities. What is needed in particular is an 
end to assigning collective identities because 
it polarizes societies in the West into a non-
Muslim majority and a Muslim minority, 
and contributes to the mutual alienation 
of Europe from countries in the Islamic 
cultural area. Yet, as the solidarity shown 
jointly by Christians, Muslims, Jews and 
non-religious citizens after the Paris attacks 
demonstrated, there is the collective will to 
work against this polarization of Europe. 
Political initiatives are urgently needed 
to reinforce this unity, not least to counter-
act the alienation of parts of the Muslim 
community in Europe from the majority 
society – an alienation that creates fertile 
breeding grounds for extremist ideologies. 
For if the Paris attacks have “succeeded”, 
their “success” lies partly in the knee-jerk 
stigmatization of Muslims in Europe, which 
creates new recruitment potential for the 
jihadists. Given this background, academics 
and politicians in particular, but also key 
media outlets, must be urged to be more 
scrupulous in their use of terms, so as to 
guard against blaming Muslims collectively 
for the crimes of individual perpetrators. 
However, that will not be easy. A promising 
approach might be the one taken by Danish 
officials in reaction to the deadly Copen-
hagen shootings on 14 February 2015, which 
have been widely interpreted as copycat 
acts of the Paris attacks. While announcing 
new counter-terrorism measures and vow-
ing to defend what prime minister Helle 
Thorning-Schmidt described as “a united 
Danish society”, they strictly avoided refer-
ences to religion, and did not make the con-
nection between the attacks and Islam. 
After all, previous efforts of policy-
makers to differentiate between Muslims 
and Islamists may have been well-meant, 
but have proven counterproductive in 
several ways. First, attempts by Western 
politicians to interpret what is the correct 
Islam are almost guaranteed to annoy Mus-
lims, who rightly question the politicians’ 
theological competence. Second, the major-
ity of Islamist movements also reject vio-
lence. It would therefore make more sense 
to refer not to Islamists, but to jihadists or 
to Islamists prepared to use violence. Third, 
referring to the religion of Muslim co-
citizens makes them members of a quasi-
endogamous ethnic group because even 
non-religious Muslims are thus reduced to 
their identity as representatives of Islam. 
Instead, Muslims in Europe should be per-
ceived and treated above all in their identity 
as citizens – citizens who, as such, bear 
no more responsibility for jihadist acts of 
violence than their non-religious, Jewish or 
Christian fellow citizens. At the same time, 
attempts to conceal the religious back-
ground to attacks are also wide of the mark, 
since the perpetrators claim that Islam con-
fers legitimacy on their deeds. 
It would be more useful to look at the 
socio-economic and political context in 
which extremist readings of Islam flourish, 
rather than debating whether Islam itself 
has a violence problem. In many parts 
of the Arab world, Muslims have been 
subjected to authoritarian repression for 
decades. The majority of the states con-
cerned rank among the lowest in the world 
for levels of free speech and press freedom. 
In many countries where the upheavals of 
the “Arab Spring” failed to effect a regime 
change, state repression has only intensi-
fied. Only a few days after the Saudi and 
Egyptian foreign ministers marched through 
Paris for freedom of expression, a young 
woman activist was killed by shotgun 
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pellets during a demonstration in Egypt, 
and a young blogger in Saudi-Arabia 
received his first 50 lashes of the whip for 
blasphemy. To prevent renewed challenges 
to the status quo, autocrats especially in 
Egypt and the Arab States of the Gulf are 
taking increasingly harsh action against 
the opposition, rather than trying to in-
clude it in the political process. Paradoxi-
cally, this attitude creates a fertile breeding 
ground for extremism, which gains traction 
particularly where central state control is 
collapsing and violent conflicts abound. 
Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen provide strik-
ing examples of this. 
Against this backdrop, it is in Germany’s 
as well as its European partners’ interest not 
only to take equally decisive action against 
racism and Islamophobia as against anti-
Semitism, but also to be more resolute vis-
à-vis their partners in the Arab world in 
speaking up for inclusiveness and respect 
for human rights – including those of 
Islamist citizens. 
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